——— FINANCIAL POLICY FORUM
———
DERIVATIVES STUDY CENTER
www.financialpolicy.org 1660 L Street, NW, Suite 1200
rdodd@financialpolicy.org Washington, D.C. 20036
SPECIAL POLICY REPORT 3
John
Nolan
Derivatives Study Center
New Rules for Global Finance
September 29, 2001
This paper will be an analysis of how certain hedge funds have attempted to exploit some of the shortcomings of the process of restructuring and forgiving emerging market debt. After having bought this debt on the secondary market at steep discounts, hedge funds have attempted to attain favorable debt-servicing treatment through litigation and free-riding in the restructuring process. By pursuing litigation instead of participating in the debt restructuring process, hedge funds sue the sovereign debtor in the hopes of attaining full principal and interest. Hedge funds have acted as free-riders by not agreeing to restructure their debt while other creditors and the debtor share the burden of debt restructuring (which may, for example, be fiscal tightening and economic austerity for the sovereign debtor, and debt forgiveness and longer maturities for the creditors). In order to illustrate this, I shall be looking at specific cases. In Peru, a hedge fund was effectively able to use litigation to gain more favorable debt-servicing treatment; while in Ecuador, recalcitrant creditors were effectively bailed-into the restructuring process. The analysis will be driven by specific cases (particularly that of Ecuador), but it will also include the broader topic of the developments and evolution of emerging debt markets.
In the world of emerging market debt, the
need of debtors and creditors to restructure debts has been and likely always
will be an inveterate and persistent feature.
The economic performance of emerging market economies tends to be
volatile — beyond the effectiveness of the fiscal and monetary policies that
these developing nations pursue, their economies are often subject to the
vicissitudes of such external factors as world commodity prices and the
monetary policies of the developed world.
A previously sustainable debt profile may be rendered unsustainable for
an emerging market nation for a whole host of economic, political and even
“natural” reasons.
Thus, the debt restructuring process has
become an integral part of the emerging debt market. This process is best if it is orderly and in the best interest of
both debtors and creditors. Attempts by
rogue creditors or vulture hedge funds to capture extra profits by free-riding
on the restructuring process lead to economic inefficiency as the process is
disrupted or sabotaged, and the costs are disproportionately incurred by debtor
and the other creditors alike. Recent
attempts to involve the private-sector (PSI) in the restructuring process and
to effectively bail-in dissenting creditors have constituted a much-needed
policy response to the harmful behavior of maverick creditors.
The current state of the debt
restructuring process is conditioned by historical events. I shall therefore begin by relating how
emerging market financing has experienced extraordinary flux over the past
twenty-five years.
Part 2:
The Evolution of Debt Restructuring in Developing Countries
1970s
Commercial Bank Loans
During the 1970s, commercial banks began
to lend to developing countries. This
was unprecedented in the sense that it was the first time in history that the
main part of development finance was coming from commercial banks — and not
from investors in bonds or projects or from exporters to the region.[1] This movement towards commercial bank
lending in developing countries was extremely significant. In the case of defaults on the
debt-holdings, only a small group of commercial banks would be directly hurt;
but because of the importance of these banks in the international financial
system, defaults could create externalities and repercussions that would
eventually jeopardize the viability of the entire international financial
system.[2]
There are numerous possible reasons for
the commercial bank lending to developing or lesser-developed countries (LDCs)
that emerged during the 1970s. One
involves the oil price shock of 1973.
This event caused a dramatic increase in the oil revenues of OPEC (the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries); OPEC deposited much of its
funds in Eurodollar deposits with major commercial banks (these became known as
“petrodollars”). A combination of high
real interest rates and a recession (in part due to the oil price shock) in the
industrialized world made investment of the petrodollar funds there unviable.[3] Instead, the petrodollars were invested (or
“recycled”) in the form of commercial bank loans to the LDCs. The purpose for the LDCs was to finance
their balance of payments adjustment (i.e. their widening current account
deficit, which was in part goaded by the rise of oil prices).[4]
The
commercial banks lent to the LDCs under a syndicated loan structure. A syndicated loan is essentially a large
loan that is made by a consortium of banks and financial institutions. However, what makes a syndicated loan
distinct as a form of multibank lending is the high level of coordination
between the lending banks in making such a loan: “A syndicated loan is made to a single
borrower by two or more direct lending institutions, on similar terms and
conditions, using common documentation and administered by a common agent bank
or separate agent banks.”[5]
The implications
of using the syndicated loan structure of financing are extremely
important. By using loans as opposed to
other forms of financing, the banks had relatively illiquid assets on the
banks’ balance sheets. Unlike bonds,
which are securitized and are generally liquid assets, loans tend to be
difficult to trade or unload. With the
banks’ high loan exposures to the LDCs (particularly with respect to their
levels of capital), they essentially became tied to the economic fates of these
countries.[6] Should the LDCs not be able to pay back
their debts, the effects would be devastating (because of their massive loan
exposures, many banks would become insolvent).
And this situation was not just extremely dangerous for the banks
themselves, it was also dangerous for the entire international financial
system. The implication of the failure
of major commercial banks extended way beyond the banks and their
depositors. Massive bank failures posed
a systemic risk with far-reaching external effects — i.e. bank failures would
indeed lead to international financial crisis.
There are a number
of possible reasons why the banks “chose” the syndicated loan structure as
opposed to other forms of financing structures (namely bonds). One is that the historical experience of the
bond crises during the 1930s put strict controls on international securities
markets, which also helped in perpetuating the notion that institutional
investors had better access to information than individual investors.[7]
Another possible
reason was associated with the pecuniary advantages the banks had to lend to
the LDCs. The loan structure allowed
the banks to lock in a profitable spread between their assets (loans to the
LDCs) and their liabilities (the petrodollar deposits).[8] This was particularly true given that the
commercial banks were able to shift both the interest rate and currency risk on
to the LDCs. Additionally, the major
lead banks were able to generate sizeable fees for the syndication of the
commercial bank debt.[9]
Syndication also
limited the amount and type of creditors that could be involved. This feature of syndication had the
advantage of interlinking the interests of the banks. A bond offering, for
example, would have been less likely to do this, as a bond offering would have
allowed a more heterogeneous and a larger group of creditors with different
interests to become involved. The
unification and interlinking of interests that syndication provided had the
potential of being an asset in the instance of debt negotiations.
Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, there was tacit support by the U.S. government for
the bank lending to the LDCs. Lax
regulation by the U.S. government allowed the banks to accumulate significant
sovereign risk.[10] The banks ostensibly held the belief that
they would receive assistance from the official sector should they incur losses
on their loans.[11] The commercial banks were widely held to be
‘too big to fail’ — governments were obliged to intervene and save potentially
insolvent banks in order to stave off a financial crisis.[12] The U.S. government’s rationale for bank
lending apparently stemmed from its desire to see official sector funds to
developing countries scaled back. The
U.S. government and the governments of industrialized countries wanted to see
the petrodollars recycled, but they didn’t want public organizations to do it.[13] Since the commercial banks were the
recipients of the oil deposits — and were sophisticated financial institutions
with the ability to lend these deposits —, they seemed the most logical actors
to recycle the funds.
However,
the potential benefits of this lending-borrowing relationship were not limited
to the banks. The lenders (i.e. the
LDCs) also needed and wanted the commercial bank loans. With the bank loans, the LDCs were able to
fund their import consumption (which, as alluded to before, was increasing in
part due to the rise of oil prices).
The LDCs could have done possibly done this through other sources, but
bank financing held distinct advantages.
During
the 1950s and 1960s, financing for developing nations came primarily from
official institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank.[14] Unlike these funds from official sources,
the bank loans had no conditions attached to them (the official sector
generally promulgated that a particular LDC instituted specific economic and
political policies before monetary assistance was disbursed).[15]
Nevertheless,
there were potential drawbacks to the loans that the LDCs borrowed from the
commercial banks. The petrodollar loans
were variable-rate and were almost exclusively dollar-denominated. This meant that the LDCs bore the
interest-rate and exchange risk. During
much of the 1970s, this circumstance didn’t really hurt the LDCs since they
were paying low real interest rates on their debts (this was due to relatively
low nominal interest rates and high rates of inflation).[16] During the late 1970s, these circumstances
changed. The U.S. Federal Reserve began
to tighten its monetary policy — thus driving up nominal interest rates and
lowering inflation rates. This left the
LDCs paying exorbitantly high real interest rates.[17] By the early 1980s, it became increasingly
clear that the debt profiles of the LDCs were unsustainable.
And with the U.S.
Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening and an economic recession in the
industrialized countries (thus limiting their appetite for imports from the
LDCs), the LDCs began to have rising interest payments on their external debt
with floundering export revenues.[18] With these conditions, the LDCs were in
perilous waters. The first emerging
market debt crisis of the 1980s occurred in Mexico (which was the largest
debtor in the developing world — the biggest recipient of the petrodollar
flows). After the Mexico crisis, commercial banks were highly reluctant to extend
any new financing, although eventually they would be persuaded — through the
subsequent debt restructurings — to provide additional funds to avoid having
their loans designated as non-performing.[19] As
the capital flow to the developing world dried up, it became increasingly clear
that the debt portfolios of the LDCs were unsustainable. Throughout the 1980s, exorbitant
external debt burdens strangled economic growth in these economies. IMF austerity programs, which were
implemented to mitigate the problems of the debt-saddled LDCs, provided
short-term aid but caused long-term economic stagnancy (as the name implies,
the IMF austerity plans imposed fiscal and monetary tightening on the
recipients).[20] The
decade of the 1980s has thus been referred to by commentators as “the lost
decade” for emerging market economies. The debt restructurings during this era did
little to alleviate these problems.
They provided short-term, ad hoc “solutions” for a persistent and
long-term problem.
The Resolution of the Debt Crisis:
The Brady Plan & Economic Liberalization
In the early 1990s, a major step was made
towards the mitigation of the developing world’s debt problems through the
Brady Plan. The Brady Plan called for a
writedown of the bank debt under the voluntary conversion of the commercial
bank loans to an LDC into collateralized bonds (they would be collateralized by
U.S. Treasury debt).[21] Through this securitization, “the bank loans
owed by a sovereign debtor are repackaged as bonds, which are offered to the
public. The proceeds of the bond offering are then used to retire the country’s
outstanding bank loan indebtedness.”[22] The Brady Plan was a flexible plan that
offered options to the commercial bank loan holders: these holders could choose from “a menu of Brady bond options to
receive in exchange for their sovereign loan assets.”[23] The most popular choices were the par and
discount bonds. By having different
types of bond instruments, the Brady bonds became enticing investment choices
for new groups and types of investors.
These bonds were securitized and thus were much more liquid assets than
the commercial bank loans. The Brady
restructurings helped expand the base of investors in emerging market debt,
which facilitated the expansion of the secondary market for emerging market
sovereign debt.
The Brady Plan: “not only allowed the dissemination of risk across a
heterogeneous pool of agents, but it also allowed economic agents to price the
debt according to market, economic, and political conditions, without
overburdening any particular organization.
The use of market mechanisms also provided investors with rewards in
return for the assumption of risk.”[24] The Brady-style restructurings were also an
important step for the LDCs because under the restructurings, the debt was
written down, the interest-rate risk exposure moved from the debtor nations to
the creditors (because the new Brady bonds were primarily fixed-rate
instruments), and the debtor nations had the ability to retire some of their
sovereign debt by buying their Brady bonds on the secondary market at a
discounted price. Nevertheless, despite
the definite merits of it, the Brady Plan — precisely by expanding the market —
created potential problems for future restructurings.
While the Brady Plan fundamentally
altered the dynamics of the sovereign debt market, other innovations and
developments fundamentally altered the dynamics of international capital
markets, in general. International
financial markets evolved, reaching unprecedented levels of sophistication
during the 1990s. Many emerging market
countries liberalized their economies during the late 1980s and early
1990s. This attracted capital flows
from international private investors (particularly portfolio investors).[25] This influx of foreign capital helped
foster further sophistication of many emerging capital markets. This capital flow into emerging markets was
much different from the capital flow into the emerging markets during the
1970s. These capital flows were no
longer heavily concentrated in commercial bank loans to sovereign debtors. During the 1990s, private firms in emerging
market economies were selling securitized assets (i.e. stocks and bonds) to a
heterogeneous group of investors; a sophisticated international interbank loan
and swap market also developed to facilitate financing in developing countries;
finally, much external financing in emerging market economies came in the form
of relatively stable foreign direct investment.[26]
The liberalization and sophistication of
international capital markets, like the Brady Plan, represented progress for
the developing world and the developed world alike. But also like the Brady Plan, this progress came with its share
of tribulation. The capital flows that
swept through the developing world proved to be fickle. Pre-liberalization business and government
structures also persisted despite movements towards liberalization. For economies just learning their gait in
the midst of new capital market structures, these exigencies proved to be
hazardous. And thus, throughout the latter
part of the 1990s, a whole slew of financial crises developed in emerging market
economies.[27]
Despite the obvious importance of these financial crises, they are not the primary emphasis of this paper. For the developments in international capital markets have produced two different types of crises. The first is the type of financial crisis alluded to in the last paragraph. The second, which is the primary focus of this paper, is with regard to sovereign debt. This type of crisis is distinguished from the sovereign debt crises of the 1980s because it involves bond debt, and not commercial bank loans. This breed of crisis that tends to occur in countries that are small and that don’t have advanced capital markets (and thus still rely primarily on lending at the sovereign level). It also tends to involve questions of insolvency (meaning that fundamentally the country cannot service its debt without a restructuring involving substantial debt forgiveness). These are the sovereign debt crises developing in the developing in the post Brady Plan environment.
The circumstances surrounding sovereign
debt drastically changed in the wake of the Brady Plan. The development of secondary markets in
emerging-market bond debt and the Brady-style restructurings of the early 1990s
changed the dynamics of sovereign debt restructurings. When commercial bank syndicated loans
conditioned sovereign debt lending, the restructuring of the debt tended to
proceed in a relatively orderly process.
The restructuring of official-sector and private-sector debt to
emerging-market sovereign debtors was traditionally contingent upon the
acceptance of an IMF structural adjustment program.[28] The traditional restructuring process
usually began with bilateral debt negotiations between the sovereign debtor and
its Paris Club lenders. The second
stage was usually a restructuring of commercial bank loans (the collective
group of commercial banks is commonly referred to as the London Club of commercial
banks).
The lending banks had vested interests in
seeing an orderly restructuring. The
banks rolled over the debt to avoid declaring default on the debt (because they
did not want to have bad or non-performing loans on their balance sheet).[29] They also generally had long-term interests
in emerging market economies and were thus inextricably tied to the economic
well-being of the countries they lent to; it was thus undoubtedly within their
interests to cooperate.
Besides the banks’ self-interest in
restructuring, there were also external pressures exerted upon them. During the days of a homogeneous group of
creditors, there was a systematic mechanism of hegemonic influence. The commercial banks involved in the
syndicated loans (and thus the financing of the debt) were subject to regulatory
oversight in their home countries: the governments of developed countries were
able to exert due influence upon the banks when it became necessary. Furthermore, the IMF also exerted influence
on the commercial banks; the IMF only extended bridge loans to sovereign
debtors on the condition that all of the country’s creditors provided bridge
loans as well.[30] The banks needed continuing interest
payments and time to build up loan-loss reserves; and these conditions would
only be borne out by IMF involvement.[31] In addition to the external pressure, the
bank creditors would also exert influence upon one another. In most defaults, a bank advisory committee
(BAC) would be created, headed by twelve to fourteen of the largest bank creditors,
to represent creditor interests.
Regulatory pressures were imposed upon maverick bank creditors that
sought to abstain or hold-out from the negotiations; these pressures basically
forced any dissenting banks to agree with the restructuring.[32]
All
parties were thus dependent upon one another:
the banks deemed it essential that the debtor countries implement
austerity programs; the debtor countries would not implement austerity programs
unless the IMF extended loans; the IMF would not make loans unless the
commercial banks extended bridge loans.
The result of this triangular dependency was [that] action was either
taken collectively or not at all.[33]
Notwithstanding the problems associated
with commercial bank lending to sovereign debtors and the ultimate
effectiveness of this traditional restructuring process of sovereign debt, the
Brady bond restructurings altered and indeed undermined this orderly and
predictable restructuring process. In
1989, the Brady Plan initiated the securitization of the defaulted loans. Banks were thus compelled to agree to a
negotiated settlement; this required them to take losses on the debt due to
principal write-downs or loss of interest. Subsequent to the Brady
restructurings, banks found it much easier to unload the bond debt, in
comparison to loans, on the secondary market.[34] Bond obligations were bought on the
secondary market by a much more decentralized group of creditors. Even though a secondary market had already
been developed for sovereign loans after the first wave of debt restructurings,
much of the secondary market trading in the loan market was inter-bank trading;
it was the Brady negotiations that truly altered the market by broadening the
base of investors.
Free-Ridership
and Collective Action Problems in Bond Restructurings and Exchanges
The Brady Plan solved many problems in
emerging market debt as it provided liquidity and new financing, but it created
a different problem — it created a potential barrier to the restructuring
process. The restructuring process of
bonds and loans is subject to the problems of “collective representation” and
“collective action.” These problems are
heightened with the movement from loans to bonds, because bondholders tend to be
widely dispersed and heterogeneous. Collective
representation problems refer to the procedural difficulties in organizing
dialogue between the debtor and group(s) of creditors. The more pernicious problems are associated
with the collective action problems.
These problems arise from the “difference between the individual
(private) and collective (social) returns related to a given course of action.”[35]
The collective action problems are much
more pervasive in the restructuring of bonds than in the restructuring of
commercial bank loans. As previously
mentioned, sovereign loans had commonly been financed by a syndicate of
banks. The syndicate arrangement tended
to foster cooperation between banks because under this arrangement there was
usually a small group of banks with relatively compatible and similar interests
for making a restructuring work.[36] The commercial banks generally had very
compelling interest for supporting a restructuring for the purpose of resuming
the service of the debt. They did not
want to declare default because this would trigger the acceleration of defaults
on other debt through cross-default provisions — and thus harm their chances
for recovery of the debt.[37] Banks didn’t want to have a whole portfolio
of non-performing loans on their balance sheets, and were thus very hesitant
about invoking defaults. Furthermore,
if these reasons were not compelling enough, banks also had external pressures
(from the IMF and their national governments in particular) exerted upon them
during restructuring processes.[38]
Because bondholders are widely scattered,
heterogeneous and autonomous, it has been seen as being difficult to compel
them into participating in debt restructurings. However, the view that bondholders are immune to restructuring
(because bonds may be considered legally senior to other forms of that debt
because of their status as secuitized assets) and that bonds are too difficult
to structure has quickly eroded over the past few years. Whether under the monikers of “bail-ins”
or “burden sharing,” the official community (particularly the Paris Club, the
IMF, and the World Bank) has demanded that bondholders and other private
investors bear the cost of financial and economic crises in emerging market
nations. These official organizations
(or International Financial Institutions (IFIs)) have sought to condition their
assistance upon the alacrity of private investors to bear the “costs of
adjustment”; these costs can come in the form of roll-overs on maturing loans,
new loans, and debt restructuring.[39] Burden sharing itself has been described as:
“the notion that if debt relief is requested from any one creditor group such
as official lenders and private bondholders, proportional relief should also be
sought by other creditor groups.”[40] The refrain from the official lenders is
that bondholders should not be privileged relative to other investors; they say
that taxpayers (represented by the Paris Club) should not be obliged to
compensate bondholders when their risky investments don’t pan out.[41] Despite the merits of this line of thought
and despite the blustery force of this rhetoric, burden sharing in bond
restructurings may still prove logistically difficult to apply or implement.
The reason once again lies in the
fundamental differences in the dynamics of restructuring commercial bank loans
and in the dynamics of restructuring bonds held by a heterogeneous group of
bondholders. The considerations that
mattered to the commercial banks in the restructurings of sovereign loans no longer
do in the epoch of liquid secondary markets for emerging market sovereign
bonds. Unlike in commercial bank loan
markets, there is very little peer pressure in bond markets, since these actors
are generally not “repeat players” and thus generally have no regard for the
interests of other players in the market or for the overall systemic well-being
of the market itself. “The new creditor
class consists largely of pension and mutual funds, insurance companies,
investment firms and sophisticated individual investors.”[42] And since these Brady bondholders generally
do not constitute lending organizations, they are not obliged to give bridge
loans or any additional financing.[43]
Individual bondholders thus have great
incentives to free-ride during the bond restructuring process. Individual investors can buy bond
obligations on the secondary market at a fraction of the full cost of the debt
and then sue the sovereign in order to enforce the entire debt.[44] These investors of bond debt on the
secondary market are more likely to pursue their claims by attaching the
sovereign’s limited U.S. assets following a default; they are also generally
not subject to the political pressures that commercial banks face to
participate in a restructuring, and they may thus have great incentives to
pursue the road of litigation.[45] Emerging-market sovereign bonds are usually
bought at a substantial discount on the secondary market (the bonds are priced
at steep discounts to reflect the bonds’ credit risk). Because of the steep price discounts
individual investor may benefit substantially in the instance of a
default. A default gives the
secondary-market investor the opportunity to use litigation as a means to
achieving debt service. Before a
default, the chances that the sovereign will be able to pay the face value at
maturity is slim; after a default, though, the investors gain the right to
accelerate the debt and to act against the sovereign’s assets in the United
States through litigation (the one wrinkle to this is that under the Brady
Plan, creditors can only receive service of the principal at maturity).[46]
This free-riding by individual rogue
creditors undermines the debt restructuring process. It is economically inefficient because it can potentially delay,
preclude or increase the costs of a debt restructuring between a sovereign
debtor and its private creditors. For
even if a debt restructuring is reached in the midst of this free-riding, the
participants in the restructuring (both creditors and debtor alike) are forced
to bear the cost of those recalcitrant creditors who do not participate. This paper looks at cases of successful and
unsuccessful actions on the part of rogue creditors in attempting to undermine
the restructuring process of sovereign debt.
In doing so, this analysis locates mechanisms that effectively limit or
prevent this pernicious free-riding.
As sovereign emerging market debt became
more liquid and tradable through the development and evolution of the secondary
market, precedents of recalcitrant creditors running to the courts began to
emerge. There have been a few cases in
which certain creditors have refused to participate in a restructuring — and
instead seek their ends through litigation; among the relevant case law
are: CIBC v. Banco Central de Brasil;
and Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru; and Elliott Associates
de la Banco de la Nacion.
Consider first the case of CIBC v. Banco
Central de Brasil. In 1988, after a
series of prior debt restructurings, Brazil and its creditors entered into a
Multi-Year Debt Facility Agreement (MYDFA).
This restructuring covered the vast majority of Brazil’s debt to
commercial bank creditors.[47] Brazil announced — only a year later — that
it would not be able to service its debt under the MYDFA. In 1992, Brazil announced a Brady Plan
securitization of MYFDA debt (called “the 1992 Accord”). Brazil’s creditors were given different
options of bonds, for which they would exchange their existing debt. Most creditors chose collateralized par
bonds, which had full service of principal but had an interest-payment
write-down. After receiving the
creditors’ commitments to the proposed restructuring, Brazil decided to alter
the terms of the restructuring. Brazil
wanted its creditors to convert at least 35% of their debt to collateralized
bonds that had huge reduction in principal.[48]
In 1993, all of Brazil’s MYDFA creditors
accepted these terms — all except the Dart family of Florida (known for being
manufacturers of Styrofoam cups). The
Dart family had been quietly accumulating Brazilian debt from creditor banks on
the secondary market at discounts of 60% or more since 1991. By 1993, they accumulated $1.4 billion in
Brazilian debt obligations, making them the fourth largest holder of Brazilian
debt.[49] The Darts decided not to participate in the
1993 amendment to the 1992 Accord. They
instead wanted to free-ride the debt restructuring by holding out for better
payment terms.
When all of the other creditors agreed to
restructure their MYDFA debt under the 1993 restructuring, the Darts should
have been left with 100% of the existing MYFDA debt. With this status, the Darts would have been able to accelerate
the debt in order to receive repayment of principal and interest (under the
terms of the MYDFA, 50% of creditors was needed — in the event of a default —
in order to accelerate the debt).
However, Brazil saw the disruptive actions of the Darts, and coordinated
a response with its central bank to combat the Darts. The Banco Central de Brasil (BDB) converted all of its MYDFA
debt, except for $1.6 billion of it.[50] This was a critical amount because it
precluded the Dart family from accelerating the debt (since with this action,
BDB — and not the Darts Family — became the majority holder of the old MYFDA
debt).
In 1994, the Darts proceeded to sue (with
the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) acting as the holder of record of
the debt) the central bank of Brazil.
They wanted the accrued but unpaid interest (pursuant to the terms of
the MYDFA) and the right to accelerate the entire principal owed.[51] U.S. government officials filed an amicus
curiae brief urging the court to dismiss the Darts’ suit because of the
harmful repercussions and undermining effects that such litigation has on the
restructuring process of sovereign debt.[52] The court blocked the Darts’ claim for the
right to accelerate the principal of the MYDFA debt but it did not dismiss
their right to have the $60 million in overdue interest serviced. The case was later settled in March of 1994
as Brazil agreed to pay $25.3 million in cash on the interest that was due in
October of 1994 and $52.3 million in bonds to cover the past-due interest that
accrued from 1988 to 1994 on the Darts’ debt holdings.[53]
Although, the Darts’ motion to accelerate
the principal was blocked, the decision ultimately worked to the Darts’
favor. The implication of the decision
was that the Darts would still have their interest payments serviced and could
still recover the $1.4 billion in principal upon the debt’s maturity.[54] However, the Darts did not have to wait
until maturity to retrieve the principal amount. In October of 1996, the Darts cashed out of their position of
Brazilian sovereign debt by issuing $1.28 billion in Eurobonds that were
secured by the MYDFA debt.[55]
Thus, the Darts emerged as the victorious
party. The Darts were able to achieve
their ends — free-ride the debt restructuring and hold out for a better
deal. They were able to accumulate
Brazilian sovereign debt on the secondary market at substantial discounts. By not entering into the Brady
restructuring, they were able to avoid a write-down of the principal on the
Brazilian debt that they held (unlike all other creditors). Through litigation, they were able to
retrieve all past-due interest payments.
Through their Eurobond offering, they were able to cash out of their
position in Brazilian debt with a substantial profit.
Pravin
Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru
The next case to consider is Pravin
Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru.
Ever since 1984, Peru had been in technical default on its debt. Peru had not paid a payment of debt
principal, and was instead merely making payments on the interest of its
debt. In 1990, Pravin Banker
Associates acquired $9 million in Peruvian debt (a very small amount of Peru’s
foreign debt) on the secondary market at a steeply discounted price (27 cents
on the dollar). They then resold all
but $1.4 million of it on the secondary market. A state-owned commercial bank (Banco Popular) made interest
payments directly to Pravin Banker Associates through February of 1992, at
which time Pravin served the bank with a notice of default and requested full
payment of principal on its debt. In
December of 1992, the Peruvian government liquidated Banco Popular. Instead of participating in the liquidation
procedures, Pravin Banker Associates sued Banco Popular for full principal.
Not long before Pravin Banker Associates’
motion to sue Banco Popular, a Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) had been formed to
restructure $8 billion of Peru’s sovereign debt under Brady Plan
negotiations. The lawsuit threatened to
undermine and disrupt the debt restructuring.
Additionally, Peru argued that “because Pravin had purchased Peru’s debt
at a substantial discount, face value recovery upon default was not
contemplated by either party, would constitute unjust enrichment, and would
permit Pravin to reap a windfall profit from Peru’s economic misfortune.”[56] Pravin, on the other hand, argued that it
was completely within its legal rights to seek the full-servicing of its
principal — regardless of what the price it paid for the debt on the secondary
market.
In this case, the court had to balance
between two competing policy interests: one was that ‘the U.S. encourages
participation in, and advocates the success of, IMF foreign debt resolutions
under the Brady plan’; the other interest was that “the U.S. has a strong
interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts under contract law.”[57] On January 19th, 1996, the court
rendered its decision.[58] It sided with the latter interest: it ruled
in favor of Pravin Banker Associates since it would otherwise be denying them
of their rights to enforce the underlying debt; according to the court, Pravin
Banker Associates did not have to enter into the Brady negotiations because by
their very nature, they were voluntary.[59] The court awarded Pravin approximately $2.16
million, in addition to accrued interest (from October 26, 1995), as well as
any post-judgment interest that might accrue.[60]
The court also tried to extricate the
case of Darts from that of Pravin, claiming that “the Darts had attempted to
use litigation to amend the terms of their loan agreement. Pravin, in contrast, sought merely to
enforce the terms of its agreement as written.”[61] More to the point, there were important
qualitative differences between the two cases.
In the Darts case, the Darts family owned $1.4 billion in Brazilian
sovereign debt, whereas in this case, Pravin Banker Associates only owned $1.4
million; completely successful litigation for principal would have probably
crippled Brazil’s Brady negotiations, whereas in this case, Peru’s Brady
restructuring was successful despite Pravin’s success (the Pravin case
represents one of nuisance litigation).[62] Undoubtedly, these circumstances were
considered by the two courts in weighing the merits of their respective cases.
Despite the court’s decision to award
Pravin over $2 million for full payment of principal and interest, Pravin still
needed to successfully attach to Peru’s assets, pursuant to the decision. In doing so, Pravin (on June 21st,
1996) made a motion to attach the property of Conade (a Peruvian state-owned
enterprise). The court, however,
rejected Pravin’s motion. The court
felt that Conade was a “separate and distinct legal entity” from Peru, and thus
Pravin could not attach its claim against Peru to Conade’s assets.[63] After a series of negotiations, Pravin and
Peru eventually reached a settlement for an undisclosed amount[64];
ostensibly, it was for a lower amount than what Pravin was litigating for in
its motion to attach to Conade’s assets.
Elliott
Associates, LP v. Banco de la Nacion of Peru
The final case is that of Elliott
Associates, LP v. Banco de la Nacion of Peru.
Under the context of an IMF supported program, Peru announced a Brady
Plan restructuring of commercial bank loans in October of 1995. Under the program, Peru would use IMF
funding for the purpose of securitizing their debt (i.e. Peru would use IMF
funds to buy U.S. Treasury debt securities to use as collateral for the Brady
restructuring).[65] There was widespread participation in the
Brady bond exchange for the defaulted commercial bank loans. However, there was a group of creditors who
refused to participate in the Brady restructuring, and instead decided to hold
out for better terms.
This
group of investors was Elliot Associates.
Elliot Associates is an investment
fund
that specializes in “distressed debt” (i.e. debt that has been defaulted upon
by the debtor to its creditors).
Between January and March of 1996, the investment fund had purchased
$20.7 million of Peruvian debt, at a discounted price of $11.4 million.[66] Elliott began purchasing this debt only
after the decision of the case of Pravin Bankers v. Banco Popular del Peru, in
which Pravin was able to successfully litigate against Peru. This suggested that Elliott made its
purchases of Peruvian sovereign debt with the intent to sue, particularly since
Elliott officials admitted to following the Pravin case (although they stated
that the timing of their purchases were coincidental).[67]
On October 8th 1996, Elliott
Associates filed suit against Peru for full principal and interest on the loans
it possessed.[68] The fund did not seek alternatives to
suing: it did not participate in the
Brady reorganization, did not offer to renegotiate, and waited until ten days
before the Brady exchange was to be signed before filing suit.[69] In its suit, Elliott wanted to attach Peru’s
assets to its claim. More specifically,
Elliott probably wanted to attach to the US Treasury securities that Peru had
purchased to use as collateral for the Brady restructuring.[70]
This case was not the first time that
Elliott had tried to litigate to receive full payments on its sovereign debt
claims. During 1995, Panama
restructured much of its external debt under the aegis of the Brady
Plan. Elliott had acquired $28.75
million (face value amount) of Panamanian sovereign loans on the secondary
market for $17.5 million prior to the restructuring. Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring and instead
made a motion to sue Panama for full payment on its debt. Elliott was successful in its
litigation. As payment on the $17.5 of
debt that Elliott had purchased, the fund received $57 million (which covered
principal and accrued interest, as well as legal costs).[71]
Elliott’s case against Peru was brought
to the U.S. District Court. It ruled
against Elliott Associates because it felt that Elliott violated Section 489 of
New York Judiciary Law (NY’s champerty law).
Elliott’s suit violated this law because the fund had ‘purchased the
debt with the intent and purpose to sue’ (which the champerty law expressly
forbids).[72] The court felt that Elliott never seriously
considered any alternatives to suing (such as entering into the Brady
restructuring, selling the debt on the secondary market, or engaging in
bilateral debt negotiations with Peru) when it bought its stock of Peruvian
sovereign loans.[73]
However, Peru’s success at blocking the
investment fund’s claim was only temporary as Elliott appealed the decision of
the district court. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court on October 20th,
1999 (more than a year after the federal district court’s dismissal of
Elliott’s claim, which was on August 6th, 1998).[74] The court stated that the investor was not
in violation because its primary purpose was collecting the debt, not
litigation (i.e. when Elliott Associates purchased the debt, their primary
purpose was to enforce the debt, as the decision to litigate was ancillary).[75] In this court’s mind, the decision to
litigate came only after the debtor’s “decision” not to pay. Despite the circumstantial evidence that
supported the claim that Elliott purchased with the direct intent to sue (such
evidence as Elliott’s history of such litigation, the timing of its decision to
Peruvian debt with respect the decision of the Pravin Bankers case, and the unwillingness
to seriously entertain options in lieu of suing to achieve debt service or
payment), the Circuit Court remained unconvinced that Elliott’s primary intent
was to sue.
The court expressed concern over the
enforceability of the champerty law since it felt that this law’s application
in such cases would essentially make the non-restructured debt instruments
completely unenforceable after a debt restructuring. And like the court in the Pravin case, this one felt that a
creditor should not be effectively forced to participate in a Brady
restructuring, because this would undermine the inherently voluntary nature of
Brady restructurings.[76]
In deciding the case, the court also
looked at the dimensions of the over-arching policy implications at stake. On the one hand, “the enforceability of
sovereign debt owed to citizens of the U.S. limits the U.S. policy in the
success of IMF-backed reorganizations,” while on the other hand, “not holding the debts enforceable will
dramatically reduce New York’s attractiveness as a global financial center;”
the court evidently sided with the latter policy consideration.[77]
Although the overturning of the District
Court’s opinion was a success for Elliott, it still needed successfully attach
its claims to specific assets of Peru’s to effectively have their debt holdings
paid. In cases of sovereign debt this
can be difficult because sovereigns have few, if any, assets that can be
attached. The reason for this is that
only assets used for commercial activity in question within the jurisdiction
where the suit is brought may be attached; since most sovereign assets related
to borrowing are within the sovereign’s own boundaries, there are few assets to
which the creditor can attach.[78]
In its attempt to successfully attach to
Peru’s assets, Elliott Associates once again made recourse to the courts. Elliott Associates essentially tried to
intercept the interest payment being made on Peru’s Brady bonds. The investment fund first did this by
attempting to attach this payment by obtaining a restraining order from a New
York court (on November 2nd, 1999) against Peru’s fiscal agent
(Chase Manhattan Bank) who was responsible for disbursing the payments. Elliott was making the argument that since
the fiscal agent is the agent of the debtor — unlike the trustee, who is the
agent of the creditors — these funds were still the property of Peru (and were
thus attachable).[79] When Peru received word of this, the country
temporarily circumvented Elliott’s attempt by stopping the transfer of funds to
its fiscal agent.[80]
Once again, Elliott responded with
litigation. Elliott argued in Brussels
Commercial court for a restraining order to be issued against Euroclear (an
international settlement system) to preclude it from either accepting funds
from Peru (for the Brady bond interest payment) or from disbursing the interest
payment to Peru’s creditors.[81] Elliott was basically arguing that the
restraining order on the fiscal agent, should — as a corollary — also apply to the fiscal agent’s bank
branches (including foreign ones) at the level of the clearing house
(Euroclear).[82] This argument was rejected by the Brussels
commercial court, which felt that one order of attachment cannot be applied to
any transfers through a bank’s branch offices.[83]
Elliott, however, once again demonstrated
its persistence in arguing for its claims in the legal arena. On June 22nd 2000, Elliott won a
decision against Peru in a New York court.
The fund won a $55.7 million judgment from for principal and past due interest
under the court’s decision.[84] Despite this victory, Elliott still had to
attach Peru’s assets.
To do this, Elliott appealed the decision
of the lower Brussels court, and the case was brought to the Court of Appeals
of Brussels. On September 22nd
2000, the Court of Appeals granted the restraining orders against both the
fiscal agent (Chase) and Euroclear — which the lower court in Brussells would
not grant.[85] With this decision, Peru’s hands were tied:
with the restraining order, Peru effectively could not pay its Brady
bondholders their interest payments without first paying Elliott its
claim. Because of the Belgian court’s
injunction, the financial institutions that clear their transactions under
Euroclear would face stiff fines if they accepted money from Peru for the
payment of interest to the Brady bondholders.[86]
Peru tried to circumvent the decision of
the Brussels court by making the interest payment on its Brady bonds through
the Bank of International Settlements.[87] However, it is not exactly clear how Peru
could have done this. By diverting the
interest payment through a foreign bank, Peru would be violating the fiscal
agency agreement and the bond covenants.[88] Peru’s changing of the payment procedure
(e.g. a change in the time, currency or place of payment) would be a breach of
its legal contracts. Thus, this route
was ultimately unsuccessful for Peru.
Furthermore, in the wake of the September
22nd decision, Peru did not have time for elaborate action. Because of the restraining order on its
fiscal agent (Chase), Peru did not make the $80 million Brady bond interest
payment that was to occur on September 7th 2000.[89] Peru had a thirty-day grace period in which
to make the payment; if Peru did not make payment by the expiration of the
grace period, it would be in technical default on its entire stock of Brady
debt. With time running out on this
grace period and mounting political problems, Peru decided to reach a
settlement with Elliott for $58.4 million on October 4th 2000 (which
would allow Peru to make its interest payment before the October 7th
deadline).[90] Minus legal fees, Elliott made profits of
$46.7 million on its original $11.7 million investment (equivalent to about a
400% return).[91]
The decisions in Elliott show that
sovereigns have little protection from maverick creditors under the NY
champerty statute (based upon the narrow judicial interpretation of it). They
also show that it certainly is possible for a recalcitrant creditor to attach
to a coupon payment being made on an existing bond.[92] Before Elliott’s success, it had been
perceived by many legal experts that it would be nearly impossible for a
maverick creditor successfully seize the assets of a sovereign debtor. The decision by the Brussels Court of
Appeals severely undermined this perception of the sovereign’s safety.
However, it is not at all clear that the
Brussels decision was based upon sound legal reasoning. In this case, Elliott made the argument that
“Peru was contractually barred from paying one group of creditor (here the
creditors that had agreed to the restructuring) before paying it (the
holdout).”[93] Elliott argued this claim by invoking the pari
passu clause (which is a standard clause in most bond indentures). Elliott essentially argued that under the
mandate of the pari passu, all creditors are to rank equally in priority
of payments; and that if there is not enough money to pay all creditors, “all
the pari passu creditors get paid pro rata out of whatever funds are
available.”[94] The Brussels appeals court accepted this
argument.
However, two legal scholars (Gulati and
Klee) argue that this is an invalid interpretation of the pari passu
clause; in doing so, they invoke the support of a number of other scholars as
well as case law. Gulati and Klee make
the point that the Brussels court’s decision is not consistent with traditional
understanding of the pari passu clause in corporate bond law. Additionally, in the sovereign context, it
is implicit that a country having trouble servicing its debts will not want to
pay all of its unsecured creditors —under the pari passu clause — on a
pro rata basis; instead, as Gulati and Klee illustrate, the debtor nation will
want to pay its more important unsecured creditors (namely the IMF and the
World Bank) first.
Beyond the inconsistency in the Brussels
court’s legal interpretation, these commentators make note of the fact that the
court’s decision exacerbates the holdout problem for sovereign debtor
nations. The decision legitimizes and
actually promotes the behavior of free riders.
Speculators are provided incentives to hold out from debt restructurings
and to litigate for full payment. Indeed,
if other courts accept the validity of the Brussels decision, there could
indeed be a proliferation of these problems in the future of sovereign debt
restructurings.
To avoid the pitfalls ever present in the
Elliott case, adjustments have been made and will need to be made. To limit the maverick creditor’s ability to
attach to payments being made to other creditors, a sovereign’s first line of
defense is using a trustee rather than a fiscal agent.[95] Since a trustee is the agent of the
creditor, a litigant will have a tougher time arguing his right to attach to
the funds of the trustee (by saying that these are de facto assets of
the sovereign.
With
regard to limiting the pitfalls latent in the pari passu clause, Gulati
and Klee recommend a number of possible remedies for the sovereign and the
majority of its creditors. These
include: altering the pari passu
clause to say ‘pari passu with respect to priority but not payment’;
using exit consents (discussed in greater detail later in the paper) to amend
the pari passu clause on existing bonds; and using English Law governed bonds
that have majority action clauses (which may result in a loss of business in
sovereign bond underwritings for New York).[96]
Summary
The above three cases are all ones that
involve litigation by recalcitrant creditors who sought to free-ride upon the
debt restructurings being negotiated by the sovereign debtor and its
creditors. In the Darts case, the court
blocked the Darts’ claim for immediate servicing of the debt’s principal;
ultimately, however, the Darts reaped a substantial profit — and effectively
dodged the principal write-downs of the Brady Plan restructuring — through
their litigation and subsequent Eurobond offering for the debt that they were
holding. In the cases of Pravin Banker
Associates and Elliot Associates, the courts ruled in favor of the maverick
investors who were suing for full repayment of principal (despite having bought
their debt holdings at substantial discounts on the secondary market). However, it is the Elliott case that truly represents
a dangerous precedent, since Elliott was able to successfully attach to Peru’s
assets to achieve a windfall profit.
Nevertheless, despite the added virulence of the Elliott case, all three
cases represent economic inefficiencies in which hold-out creditors were able
to use litigation as a means to achieving better payoffs — at the cost of the
sovereign debtor and its other creditors.
The recent cases of sovereign debt exchanges
and restructurings have sought to limit, constrain and eliminate pernicious
litigation by dissenting creditors. The
cases that I shall look at involve the restructuring of the sovereign debt of
Pakistan, the Ukraine, and Ecuador.
These cases were able to achieve a debt exchange that bailed in private
investors and that avoided litigation by recalcitrant creditors. They are effective applications of the
official sector’s demands for burden-sharing in the debt restructuring process
during the era of bond financing to emerging market debtors. Ecuador is the crucial case for the purposes
of this discussion, because it involves the restructuring of Brady bond
debt. Brady bond debt, governed by U.S.
law, does not have collective action clauses.
The sovereign bonds of Pakistan and the Ukraine, which were governed by
United Kingdom and Luxembourg law respectively, had these clauses. Nevertheless, these cases all bear important
similarities and provide important examples of successful sovereign bond restructurings.
The first case that I shall look at is
Pakistan. On November 15th
1999, Pakistan announced an offer to exchange three outstanding
dollar-denominated Eurobonds due in December 1999 and February 2002, with a total
face value of approximately $610 million, for a six-year amortizing Eurobond,
with a face value $623 million, paying a 10% coupon.[97] Pakistan had been under pressure from the
official sector to enter into a bond exchange with its private creditors. In January of 1999, Pakistan entered into an
agreement with the Paris Club to reschedule $3.3 billion in official-sector,
bilateral debt.[98] The Paris Club has a ‘comparability’ rule,
which requires equal treatment for official and private sector debt.[99] After the restructuring of its debt with
Pakistan, the Paris Club also wanted Pakistan’s private creditors to
restructure their debt. This
comparability rule had been applied to bank loans during the 1980s, but this
was the first time that it was applied to bonds.
The Pakistani bonds were held
predominately by financial institutions and retail investors in the Middle
East. Prior to the announcement of the
bond exchange, Pakistani officials and their financial and legal advisors had
been able to conduct informal discussions with a group of primary
creditors. Through these meetings, an
offer that would be favorable and acceptable to most bondholders was
created. Because Pakistan’s creditors
constituted a relatively small and homogeneous group, the communication between
Pakistani officials and its major creditors proved to be a good litmus
test. The response to the offer was
extremely favorable as over 99% of all bondholders tendered their bonds. The reasons why Pakistan’s creditors agreed
to the exchange are clear:
the
threat of default was credible; the terms offered a sweetener compared to the
market price, making it a “no-brainer” to tender the bonds, according to some
market participants, as spreads were likely to narrow after the exchange had
closed; the new bond would be more liquid than the old bonds; the new
government following the military coup made it possible to restart creditor
relations afresh; the comfort letter from the IMF was widely seen as a
guarantee that the official community would stay engaged; and a five-notch
upgrade by S&P from its first ever D-rating for a sovereign to a single
B-minus rating surprised positively. [100]
Furthermore, since Pakistan had not
defaulted on its debt at the time of the bond exchange offering, its bondholders
had little recourse to action against the sovereign: e.g., the “bondholders
could not require the trustee to accelerate the issue or to take legal action
against the debtor.”[101] Without these this possible barrier to
restructuring, Pakistan and its advisors were able to engage in a dialogue with
key creditors and construct a bond exchange that would be reasonably acceptable
to virtually all of its creditors.
Pakistan also had the benefit of
potentially helpful (with regard to facilitating the debt restructuring) legal
clauses in its bonds, but these clauses were not invoked. More specifically, the three Pakistani
Eurobonds had collective action clauses (CACs) embedded in the indenture. Collective action clauses are embedded in
most sovereign bonds underwritten in the U.K. and Luxembourg (among a limited
number of other nations where sovereign bonds are underwritten); the Pakistani
Eurobonds were underwritten in the U.K.
These clauses can be very effective, since they can bind dissenting
creditors into a debt restructuring that has been approved by a majority or a
super-majority of creditors.[102]
Only about a quarter of sovereign
emerging-market bonds have collective action clauses. The term collective action clause is not a precise legal term,
and broadly refers to the following clauses:
“majority action clauses,” “sharing clauses,” and “collective
representation clauses.” The majority
action clauses — referred to above — bind a dissenting minority into a
restructuring that is approved by a majority of bondholders. Sharing clauses make litigation less
attractive for a maverick bondholder, since these clauses require that any
funds secured by a bondholder through litigation have to be shared
proportionately (to their respective bond holdings) with the other
bondholders. Collective representation
clauses facilitate the coordination and communication of bondholders (and “make
majorities easier to assemble”) by allowing trustees or others to represent
bondholders at bondholder meetings.[103]
Since 99% of Pakistan’s bondholders
voluntarily agreed to the exchange, one can definitely make the case that the
collective action clauses were not necessary.
However, there were, ostensibly, distinct reasons for Pakistan’s decision
to try to sidestep the invocation of the collective action clauses. For despite the clear benefits of the usage
of collective action clauses in sovereign bond restructuring (most saliently
with regard to their ability to coerce dissenting bondholder(s) into a
restructuring that has been approved by a qualified majority), there are some
aspects of these clauses that a sovereign debtor might find disagreeable.
These reasons stem predominately from the
collective representation clauses in collective action clauses. Pakistan was afraid that in the case of
bondholder organization through a bondholder committee, the dissenting
creditors would be able to organize and garner strength, thus preventing the
qualified majority (needed to bind-in these creditors) to not be reached.[104] The bondholder meetings can potentially lead
to an extended and protracted negotiation process, which also gives the
creditors time to coordinate their actions to act in concert against the
debtor. In fact, no debtor nation would
want to have a meeting of its creditors unless there has already been full
disclosure of information, which would allow creditors to figure out what
conditions would make a successful debt exchange offer (this information could
potentially be disclosed by previous bilateral meeting(s) with individual
creditors or a small group of creditors).[105] A debtor nation may thus find it much more
expeditious and effective to employ its financial and legal advisors into
dialogues with certain groups of bondholders to figure out what conditions and
terms will maximize the probability of a successful bond exchange, instead of
having long and drawn-out — and potentially counterproductive (certainly from
the perspective of the debtor nation) — bondholder meetings.[106]
Nevertheless,
because collective action clauses were not invoked in the case of
Pakistan’s
bond exchange, some potential problems exist.
Because the vast majority of Pakistan’s bondholders accepted the
exchange, the dissenting bondholders constitute 100% of the holders of the old
bonds. These creditors can certainly
accelerate the debt they hold and potentially use legal action to obtain a more
favorable settlement (thus creating a clear free-rider problem). This doesn’t have serious implications for
the Pakistan case because the amount of dissenting creditors is so small, but
this might be a problem in future debt restructurings.
Furthermore, even though Pakistan’s bond
exchange was relatively successful, it doesn’t really provide a useful template
or paradigm for future sovereign bond restructurings. This is because Pakistan’s case is fairly unique. Unlike many sovereign bonds, Pakistan’s
bonds were not widely traded internationally at the major global financial
centers. Additionally, Pakistan’s bonds
were unique because they were held by a relatively small homogeneous group of
regional investors.[107] Logistically, it is much more difficult to
restructure debt that is widely held by a heterogeneous and dispersed group of
international investors.
Ukraine’s
Bond Exchange
The second case to be studied is that of
the Ukraine’s sovereign bond restructuring.
In 1989-1990, Ukraine restructured much of its sovereign bonds. At best, this restructuring provided only a
temporary solution. It “featured large
up-front costs (with cash payments of at least 20 percent), short maturities
for new debt (no more than 2 years), and high yields (up to 20 percent a
year).”[108] Within a very short amount of time, Ukraine
was left with massive — and unsustainable — debt-servicing obligations. In 2000, the Ukraine owed $3.1 billion in
external debt payments, with only $1.2 billion in hard currency reserves; since
the country had little hope of borrowing new funds or having a sufficient trade
surplus, it became clear that Ukraine would not be able to service its debt
without a restructuring.[109] Furthermore, the IMF made additional funding
on its part conditional upon Ukraine’s ability to come to amicable terms with
its commercial creditors (i.e. a restructuring of Ukraine’s external debt).[110]
On February 4th, 2000, Ukraine’s
Ministry of Finance announced an exchange proposal covering different types of
bonds. The bonds covered were four
different Eurobonds and all of the so-called “Gazprom” bonds (which consisted
of Ukraine’s debt to the Russian gas company Gazprom for gas deliveries not
paid) falling due 2000-2001.[111] This constituted an exchange of $2.6 billion
of debt.[112] Bondholders could exchange their bonds into
(depending on what type of bond they were holding): 1) dollar-denominated
7-year amortizing Eurobonds with an 11% coupon or 2) euro-denominated 7-year
conventional Eurobonds with a 10% coupon.[113] The bond exchange offered numerous
incentives for exchange: “no debt
forgiveness or reduction in principal, no interest-free grace period,
amortization starting in 2001, and cash payment of all accrued, but unpaid
interest on the outstanding bonds upon completion of the debt exchange.”[114]
Since the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance
set the overall participation threshold for the exchange of the bonds falling
due in 2000 or 2001, there was little margin of era for Ukraine and its
financial and legal advisors (the threshold was set at 85% because the ministry
of finance felt that this percentage would give the exchange credibility in
international capital markets).[115] Three of the Eurobonds were held by a
relatively small group of institutional investors. The fourth Eurobond, on the other hand, was held largely by a
dispersed group of retail investors.
For the first three Eurobonds, informal dialogues with key investors were
fairly effective — as they were in Pakistan’s debt restructuring — in gauging
what terms would be conducive towards achieving a successful bond
exchange.
However, to ensure that the exchange
reached its threshold target, more elaborate strategies were employed
(particularly for the fourth issue, with the inordinately high amount of retail
investors). Ukraine retained the
services of several investment banking firms (the lead manager being
ING-Barings), as well as a public-relations firm for the purpose of
disseminating information about the exchange to both retail and institutional
investors; among the methods employed were a road show, a highly successful and
touted internet site, individual briefings and presentations with investors,
and a constant barrage of information about the exchange aimed at the media.[116] Ultimately, these strategies worked as 99%
of the old bonds were tendered.[117]
Three of the Eurobonds had collective action clauses embedded in
their indentures under Luxembourg law (the fourth, which was governed by German
law, did not). Ukraine did not invoke
the collective action clauses until a qualified majority of proxies in favor of
the exchange was received. Upon the
receipt of a qualified majority of creditors (necessary to invoke the
collective action clauses) accepting the debt exchange, an official
“bondholders’ meeting was called, the proxies were voted, and the amendments
were adopted and binding on all bondholders.”[118]
Although the collective action clauses on
the bonds were invoked, they were of limited importance due to the overwhelming
participation by bondholders in the debt exchange. The fact that collective action clauses were invoked ex-post
— and not ex-ante — has been shown to indicate that while collective
action clauses may be helpful to the restructuring process, they are not
critical. Thus far, “the role of CACs
has been only to either provide a tool to ‘bind-in’ holdouts ex-post or to
credibly threaten their use in case an exchange offer does not work.”[119] Nevertheless, due to the collective action
clauses, all dissenting bondholders were still bound by the amendments adopted
by the qualified majority of bondholders
(in the three bonds that had CACs).
The final case that I shall look at is
that of Ecuador’s default on and restructuring of its Brady bond debt. It represents an important case, because
unlike Brady bonds — governed virtually exclusively by U.S. law — do not have collective
action clauses. Ecuador would have to
restructure its debt — and also avoid free-rider problems and other potential
pitfalls — without the benefit of these structures. It is a case that can provide a useful paradigm for future Brady
restructurings.
During August of 1999, Ecuador announced
that it would defer payment upon $96
million of interest on its Brady bond debt.[120] With this move, Ecuador became the first
country to default on its Brady bond debt.
There had been speculation for months on the possibility of a default by
the beleaguered country. Many believed
that the IMF and the U.S. Treasury both wanted to use Ecuador as a test-case
for a “bailing-in” of the private sector in sovereign debt restructurings
during the age of emerging market bonds.[121] Ostensibly, this would allow the IMF to show
that it is receptive to moral hazard concerns.
It would also provide an important precedent with regard to private
sector involvement in sovereign bond restructurings: the private sector would no longer be able expect huge
disbursements from the IMF and the official sector to bail it out in cases of
crises. The IMF told Ecuador, prior to
the default, that it would have to have a restructuring agreement with its
private creditors before a much-needed IMF loan could be made.[122] The Fund had been harshly criticized for
using public funds to bail-out lending investors and borrowing LDC
governments. The strategy of bailing-in
the private sector would seem to be easier said than done as debt restructuring
with a large group of heterogeneous bondholders (with different interests and
motives) might prove unmanageable and difficult.
After Ecuador had announced its delay of
payments in August, it had a month’s grace period to come to a resolution with
its bond creditors. On September 26th
1999, Ecuador announced its decision.[123] And while few were surprised by the decision
in August, many were surprised and dismayed by the September decision. In that decision, Ecuador’s former
President Jamil Mahuad announced that Ecuador would selectively default on only
some of its Brady bonds. He stated that
Ecuador would pay the $51.5 million in its past-due-interest bonds (PDIs), but
not the $44.5 million on its discount bonds.[124] Ecuador decided to pay the interest payments
on the former, because these bonds were not covered by interest collateral
under the Brady Plan. The discount
bonds, however, had interest collateral (under the Brady restructuring) to
cover the interest payments — and President Mahuad encouraged the discount
bondholders to use the interest collateral on the bonds to cover the interest
payments.
Of Ecuador’s $13.6 billion in external
public debt in 1999, approximately $6 billion was in Brady bond debt and $500
million was in Eurobonds. The remainder of the debt was from the official
sector, with about $3.9 billion from the IMF and another $2.7 billion in bilateral debt with the
governments of industrialized countries (the Paris Club).[125] Of the Brady Bond debt, $1.4 billion was in
discount bonds, while $3 billion was in PDI bonds (which Ecuador did pay in
September); and another $1.7 billion was in par bonds.[126] The Par bonds are bonds that were
exchanged for loans under the Brady Plan; they are at par but carry
below-market fixed interest rates; they are long-term bonds that are fully
collateralized with respect to principal and partially collateralized as to
interest. Discount bonds are bonds that
were exchanged for loans at a discount to face value under the Brady Plan; they
carry a market interest rate priced on a spread with the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR); they are also long-term issuances and are fully
collateralized as to principal and partially collateralized as to interest. The
past due interest (PDI) bonds allow countries to securitize unpaid interest
claims under the Brady Plan; they have floating interest rates and are
uncollateralized.[127]
Mahuad’s September strategy on the one
hand may seem clever, while on the other hand may seem stubborn and
unrealistic. Mahuad figured that the
interest collateral on the discounted Brady bonds would cover the missed
payment; the other bonds — the PDIs —, which were not collateralized, Ecuador
would make payment on.[128] Bondholders, however, were irate with the
decision. They were upset with Ecuador
for imposing a “unilaterally imposed non-market solution that discriminated
against certain classes of debt.”[129] The then IMF Managing Director Michel
Camedessus also expressed his ‘regrets’ over Ecuador’s inability to reach a
mutually favorable solution with its creditors.[130] Nevertheless, bondholders were angry with
the IMF and the U.S. Treasury for their alacrity to support a bond default by
Ecuador in order to create a debt restructuring that would impose further debt
reduction on the private sector (although it is certainly apparent that the IMF
and the U.S. Treasury did not support the specific terms of Ecuador’s
decision).[131]
One insurgent bondholder, in particular,
managed to bring the situation to a head. On October 5th, 1999, Marc Hélie, a manager of a hedge
fund called Gramercy Investors, mustered the support of 35 percent of the
discount bondholders to force an acceleration of Ecuador’s bond debt (he only
needed the support of 25 percent under the bond indenture).[132] (A vote to accelerate is tantamount to
voting for the default of a particular class of bonded debt.) Under a Brady bond indenture, accelerating
the bond only gives the creditors the right to the interest collateral (which
generally covers 2 to 3 interest payments); the principal collateral is not
available to the bond’s maturity.[133] Nevertheless, due to cross-default
mechanisms embedded within the debt (which were triggered by the vote to
accelerate the discount bonds), Ecuador was in default on not just the $1.4
billion of discount Brady bonds — it was in default on the over $6 billion in
Brady bonds, as well as, the $500 million in Eurobonds.[134] Ecuador had become the first country to
default on its Brady debt. And the
stage was set.
Litigation was a road not taken in the
case of Ecuador’s debt restructuring.
Although, certain intransigent creditors were able to gather the support
for acceleration of the debt, these creditors were later tied into the
restructuring process. Nevertheless,
the threat of litigation in future sovereign debt restructurings still looms
large — and indeed it did at various points during the Ecuadorian crisis. However successful the long-term economic
effects of the latest Ecuadorian debt restructuring, it represents a success
simply in the fact that it avoided harmful litigation.
The road to debt restructuring was a long
and arduous one for Ecuador and its creditors — but not as long and arduous as
many had thought. In the months
following the October default on over $6 billion of Brady bonds and Eurobonds,
Ecuadorian officials struggled to get official sector aid. Mahuad tried to get a standby loan from the
IMF for the amount of $250 million; this standby loan would have automatically
made Ecuador eligible to receive $850 million in additional credit from the
World Bank and others to provide much-needed funds to the beleaguered banking
sector.[135] However, Mahuad surprised the IMF yet again
by unveiling a plan to dollarise in January of 2000; this plan ired the IMF and
caused the negotiations for funding to crumble — and the plan made Mahuad
deeply disliked domestically.
In the months following the Mahuad’s
January plan, Ecuador made little apparent headway with regard to reaching a
solution with its creditors.
Domestically, Ecuador underwent significant change. Mahuad was ousted, and a new president —
Gustavo Noboa — was instated. Reforms
were pushed through and plans to dollarise were realized. Although inflation rose (largely due to the
dollarisation plans), the economy began to show signs of development and
growth. These developments provided a
more conducive atmosphere for Ecuador to conduct fruitful negotiations. By April of 2000, the Ecuadorian government
was able to come to an agreement with the IMF.
The IMF agreed to provide a one-year stand-by loan for about $306
million.[136] And the government, through these
negotiations with the IMF, was also able to receive multilateral funds of close
to $2 billion “for an ambitious program of fiscal adjustment and financial
sector reforms.”[137]
On July 27th, 2000, Ecuador
announced an exchange offer to swap the defaulted bonds for about $4 billion in
new bonds and about $1 billion in cash (for accrued interest and principal
collateral).[138] The exchange offer allowed bondholders to
swap the defaulted bonds into a 30-year Eurobond with a step-up provision on
the coupon from 4% to a maximum of 10% (this means that the interest rate rises
1% a year to a maximum of 10%).
Additionally, the bondholders were given the option of converting the
30-year bond into a 12-year Eurobond with a fixed coupon of 12% at the exchange
ratio of .65 to 1.[139] The bondholders were also offered a cash
disbursement in full of accrued, but unpaid, interest on Discount and Par Brady
bonds.[140]
Approximately 97 % of Ecuador’s Brady
bond investors accepted the exchange, in which they accepted an approximately
40 percent “haircut” (or write-down) on the principal.[141] Although 97% of creditors accepted the
resolution, the process leading up to it was not without its tumult. The Ecuadorian authorities had been
unwilling to enter into discussions with dissenting creditors, due partly to
the fact that the restructuring process was complicated because a number of
different classes of debt were involved.[142] Authorities instead met with a Consultative
Group, which consisted of eight institutional investors with particularly large
exposures (the information discussed in the meetings was disclosed for the
benefit of the other bondholders); however the authorities did not disclose any
information about the restructuring terms (they did this by citing U.S.
securities law).[143]
Ecuador — and the lawyers and bankers on
its deal team — had to be innovative in working its way around NY law. The challenge was to compel the vast
majority of private creditors to willingly enter into the restructuring and to
prevent, or at least limit, potential litigation from hold-out creditors; the
exchange was able to do this through the use of cash disbursements, exit
consents, and principal reinstatement clauses.
The exchange offer was unprecedented because it was the first example of
the use of exit consents to make it unpalatable for investors to hold-out from
the restructuring. [144] “An exit consent (or exit amendment) is a
written consent to an amendment that is tendered along with an exchange
offer (i.e. the consent is given as a
bondholder exits the bond).”[145] The exit-consent amendments only require a
supermajority (although in order to meet IMF projections on debt service
ability, 85% of bondholders actually needed to sign on[146]),
while a change in the payment terms, under NY law, would require
unanimity. New York law governing
bonds, unlike U.K. and Luxembourg law, do not have collective action clauses
that allow a qualified majority to bind-in maverick creditors into a debt
restructuring. Thus, an adroit usage of
exit consent amendments was imperative for the allowance of a successful
exchange of Ecuadorian bonds. The
implementation of exit consents managed to achieve this by stipulating that the
exiting bondholders (in entering into the bond exchange):
Strip
away cross-default and cross-acceleration provisions to the new bonds (the new
bonds include a cross-acceleration clause but cannot be triggered by continued
defaults on the old bonds); reduce liquidity of the old bonds by delisting
them; change negative pledge clauses; limit attachment possibilities of debt
service made and on the new bond . . . [147]
The exit consents limited the ability of
holdouts to attach their debt claims to the assets of the sovereign. By eliminating the cross-default and
cross-acceleration clauses, the holdouts had no ability to declare the new
bonds to be in technical default.
Ecuador, through the restructuring, retained the right to hold the old
Brady bonds, which precludes the holdouts from constituting the 25% needed to
accelerate these bonds. By eliminating
the old bonds from exchange listings, they were made illiquid. Finally, under the debt exchange, a trustee
was used instead of a fiscal agent for disbursing the funds for debt
servicing. This presumably makes it
more difficult for holdouts to attach their claims to payments being made on
the new bonds (as was done in the case of Elliot Associates and Peru) because
the trustee is an agent of the creditor and not of the debtor.[148]
Other measures were also taken to assure
investors of the sustainability of Ecuador’s ability to service its debt. The terms of the restructuring require
Ecuador to buy back portions of the debt stock — under an orderly timeline —
prior to maturity; Ecuador has to “repurchase 3% of the outstanding stock of
2030 bonds in each of the last 17 years of the bond’s life, and 10% of the
outstanding stock of 2012 bonds in each of the last six years of the bond’s
life.”[149] The requirement on Ecuador to manage its
debt by reducing the size of it (whether through buybacks in the open market or
by other means) prior to maturity has a number of virtues. It provides greater assurance that Ecuador
will be able to service its debt upon maturity (since the debt stock will be
reduced to a more manageable level), and it should benefit liquidity and prices
in the secondary market since Ecuador will be a large and conscientious buyer
of the debt.[150]
Under the terms of the debt exchange,
changes were made to compensate bondholders in the event of a default. In the instance of a default by Ecuador,
there would be a re-inflating of principal on the long-term bond debt — the
amount of principal re-inflation would depend on the timing of the default
(i.e. there would be more generous compensation if the default occurred early
in the life of the bond).[151] This principal re-inflation in the incidence
of default “would mitigate some of the haircut” or debt write-down mandated in
the restructuring.[152]
The Ecuador restructuring created important and beneficial changes
in the circumstances of the country’s debt servicing ability. Through the restructuring Ecuador’s Brady
bond and Eurobond stock fell 40%.[153] Additionally, Ecuador’s short-term cash flow
problems were mitigated since the bond exchange gave Ecuador $1.5 million in
cash-flow savings over the first five years (in comparison to what they would
have had to pay under the contracts of the old bonds).[154]
Furthermore, Ecuador’s restructuring of
its privately-held Brady bond debt afforded it the opportunity to restructure
its official-sector debt. And in
September of 2000, Ecuador was able to reschedule its multilateral debt with
the Paris Club of official sector creditors.
The debt restructuring covered 100% of arrears on April 30th
2000, as well as, the principal and interest that fell due and was falling due
from May 1st 2000 to April 30th 2001.[155] This restructuring covered $887 million of
Ecuador’s official sector debt obligations.[156] A goodwill provision was also included in
which the Paris Club creditors pledged to consider a further rescheduling of
Ecuador’s debt after 2001.[157] Under the Paris Club’s current rules,
Ecuador is not eligible for debt relief.
Based upon the guidelines for HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) aid,
Ecuador’s GDP is too high for debt relief, despite Ecuador’s massive debt
burden (debatably an unsustainable one).[158] This condition may change if the Paris
Club, the IMF and the World Bank reconsider the criteria for debt forgiveness.
All in all, the restructuring process
represented clever maneuvering around the limitations of NY law. Potentially dissenting bondholders were
coerced to make the exchange because the exit consent agreements put negative
amendments upon the old bonds, which caused the old bonds to decrease in
value. The exit consents effectively
made it very undesirable to continue to hold (and thus not exchange) the old
bond debt. The debt restructuring
process was able to preclude litigation efforts from resistant creditors through
the exit amendments, because these amendments removed the cross-default and
negative pledge clauses on the old bonds.
The removal of these clauses gave and continues to give Ecuador the
ability and right “to reacquire and to
hold certain of its Brady bonds,” which makes it virtually impossible for
dissenting bondholders to accelerate those bonds after the exchange.[159] Exit amendments also allow for the removal
of the waiver of sovereign immunity from the bond contracts (most sovereign
bonds contain an express waiver of jurisdictional sovereign immunity in cases
of litigation), which makes the sovereign debtor virtually impervious to
harmful litigation by a remaining holdout creditor.[160] The exit consents provide a remedy to the
holdout creditor problem and facilitate an orderly bond restructuring between a
sovereign debtor and its creditors.
The Ecuadorian debt crisis — as do the
Pakistani and Ukrainian debt crises —represents the new-style of sovereign debt
crisis, which involves bond debt instead of commercial bank loans. As the first
restructuring of Brady bond debt, it is a true departure from the 1980s
sovereign debt crises.
The Ecuadorian restructuring is an
important precedent of how there can be an orderly restructuring of emerging
market debt in the era of bond financing to emerging market countries. It shows how a bond restructuring can be
achieved with a heterogeneous group of bondholders with competing
interests. It also shows how this can
be done even with the absence of collective action clauses, which bind dissenting
creditors into a debt restructuring with the agreement of a qualified majority
to enter into debt restructuring. The
Ecuador case instead used exit consent agreements. The usage of exit consent
mechanisms coerced virtually all creditors into the restructuring process by
imposing negative amendments on the old bonds.
This case proved that a restructuring of Brady bonds is possible. It offers a template for how moral hazard
and free-riding can be reduced in future sovereign debt restructurings.
It is indeed an encouraging example of
how dissenting creditors can be stopped from undermining the debt restructuring
process. Vulture hedge funds, which
bought Brady bonds on the secondary market at steep discounts, had the
potential of free-riding upon the negotiations between the sovereign debtor and
other creditors by trying to use litigation as a way to obtain debt service on
interest and principal. Exit consents,
by coercing dissenting creditors into debt exchanges, undermined these
attempts. In the absence of collective
clauses, they represent a way for the sovereign debtor and its creditors to
protect themselves against the harmful and opportunistic behavior of these
vulture hedge funds.
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[1] Buckley, Ross. Emerging Market Debt: An Analysis of the Secondary Market. (Kluwer International: 1999). Pg. 8.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Cline, William R. International Debt: Systemic Risk and Policy Response. Washington: Institute for International Economics. (1984) Referred to in “Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Prevention & Resolution.” Chapter V of International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. (September, 2000)
[4] World Bank. “Private Capital Flows in Historical Perspective.” Global Development Finance 2000. Washington DC: World Bank. Pg. 123.
[5] Norton, Joseph J. “International Syndicated Lending and Economic Development in Latin America: The Legal Context.” Essays in International Financial & Economic Law. London: The London Institute of International Banking, Finance & Development Law. (No. 9, 1997) Pg. 10.
[6] Dooley, Michael P. “A Retrospective on the Debt Crisis.” Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research . (December, 1994) Pgs 7-8. Also see Cline, William R. “International Debt: From Crisis to Recovery?” American Economic Review, Volume 75, Issue 2. (May, 1985). Pg. 185.
[7] “Private Capital Flows in Historical Perspective.” Pg. 123.
[8] Dooley, Michael P. Pg. 14.
[9] Aggarwal, Vinod K. “The Evolution of Debt Crises: Origins, Management, and Policy Lessons.” University of California Berkeley. (May, 2000)
[10] Dooley, Michael P. Pg. 14.
[11] “Private Sector Involvement in Crisis Prevention & Resolution.” Pg. 123.
[12] Dooley, Michael P. Pg. 5
[13] Ibid.
[14] Aggarwal, Vinod K.
[15] Allegaert, Theodore. “Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor Nations, or How to Play Darts.” Minnesota Journal of Global Trade. (Summer, 1997)
[16] Buckley, Ross P. Pg. 8.
[17] Dooley, Michael P. Pgs. 13-14. Also see Buckley, Ross P. Pg. 22.
[18] Chaudhuril, Adhip. “Mexican Debt Crisis, 1982.” The Pew Cases in International Affairs. (1989) Pg. 4.
[19] Bordo, Michael D. “International Rescues Versus International Bailouts: An Historical Perspective.” Rutgers University and NBER. Prepared for the Cato Institute’s 16th Annual Monetary Conference. (October 22nd, 1998) Pg. 6.
[20] MacMillan, Rory. “The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Stanford Journal of International Law. (Summer, 1995)
[21] Buckley. Pg. 102.
[22] Power, Philip J. “Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its Implications for Future Restructurings.” Fordham Law Review. (May, 1996)
[23] Ibid.
[24] Molano, Walter T. “From Bad Debts to Healthy Securities? The Theory and Financial Techniques of the Brady Plan.” Brady Net Inc. Editorial. http://www.bradynet.com.
[25] Chun, John H. “‘Post-Modern’ Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum.?” Fordham Law Review. (May, 1996)
[26] Global Development Finance 2000. The World Bank. Pg. 126.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Buckley. Pg. 30.
[29] Gopinath, Deepak. “The Man Who Broke Ecuador.” Institutional Investor. (November 1st, 1999)
[30] Goldman, Samuel E. “Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructurings.” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. (Spring/Summer, 2000)
[31] Macmillan, Rory.
[32] Goldman, Samuel E.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Gopinath, Deepak.
[35] Dixon, Liz and David Wall. “Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses.” Financial Stability Review. (June 2000). Pg. 143.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Goldman, Samuel E.
[38] Power, Philip J.
[39] Eichengreen, Barry and Christof Rühl. “The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means.” (May, 2000) Pg. 2.
[40] Buchheit, Lee C. “Sovereign Debtors and their Bondholders.” Unitar Training Programmes on Foreign Economic Relations, Document 1. (Geneva, 2000)
[41] Ibid. Also see “Sovereign Policy.” The Economist. (February 13th, 1999)
[42] Power, Philip J.
[43] Goldman, Samuel E.
[44] Goldman, Samuel.
[45] Power, Philip J.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Power, Philip J.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Allegaert, Theodore.
[50] Power, Philip J.
[51] Goldman, Samuel E.
[52] Allegaert, Theodore.
[53] Bloomberg Business News. “Brazil Settles a Suit With Dart Family.” The New York Times. (March 20th,1996)
[54] Power, Philip J.
[55] Evans, Catherine. “Brazil’s Plan for Global Bond Issue Is Clouded by Dart Family’s Offering.” Wall Street Journal. (October 2nd, 1996)
[56] Power, Philip J.
[57]Goldman, Samuel E.
[58] Lindenbaum, Eric and Alicia Duran. “Debt Restructuring: Legal Considerations Impact of Peru’s Legal Battle and Ecuador’s Restructuring on Nigeria and Other Potential Burden-Sharing Cases.” New York: Merrill Lynch. (October 30th, 2000) Pg. 2.
[59] Goldman, Samuel E.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Power, Philip J.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Pravin
Banker Associates, Ltd. Vs. Banco Popular del Peru and the Republic of
Peru. 9
F. Supp. 2d 300 (US District Court, 1998)
[64] Information obtained from a telephone conversation with Mark Cymrot, an attorney at Baker & Hostetler LLP, who defended Peru against Pravin Banker Associates (and later against Elliott Associates).
[65] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises — Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds.” Prepared by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments of the IMF. Pg. 12.
[66] Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Circuit, 1999)
[67] Ibid. Also see Lipworth and Nystedt. “Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation.” IMF Working Paper. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. (November, 2000)
[68] Lindenbaum, Eric and Alicia Duran. Pg. 2.
[69] Goldman, Samuel E.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Circuit, 1999). Also see Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332 (District, 1997).
[72] Goldman, Samuel E.
[73] Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Circuit, 1999).
[74] Lindenbaum & Duran. Pg. 2.
[75] Goldman, Samuel E.
[76] Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Circuit, 1999).
[77] Goldman, Samuel E.
[78] Gulati and Klee. Pg. 635.
[79] Lindenbaum and Duran.
[80] Gulati and Klee.
[81] Ibid.
[82] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises — Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds.” Also see Lindenbaum and Duran.
[83] Lindenbaum and Duran.
[84] Elliott
Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14169 (District,
2000)
[85] Lindenbaum and Duran.
[86] Remond, Carol S. “Peru Settles Dispute With Elliott For $58M.” Dow Jones Newswires. (September 29th, 2000)
[87] Ibid.
[88] Lindenbaum and Duran.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Remond, Carol S.
[91] Lipworth and Nystedt. Pg. 36.
[92] Lindenbaum and Duran. Pg.3.
[93] Gulati & Klee. Pg. 636.
[94] Ibid. Pg. 637.
[95] Lindenbaum and Duran.
[96] Gulati and Klee. Pgs. 650-651.
[97] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises — Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds.” Pg. 30.
[98] “Another Coup.” The Economist. (November 27th, 1999)
[99] Luce, Edward. “Pakistan’s New Six-Year Issue Faces Opposition.” Financial Times. (December 8th, 1999)
[100] Lipworth & Nystedt. Pg. 29.
[101] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.”
[102] Power, Philip J.
[103] “Resolving and Preventing Financial Crises: The Role of the Private Sector.” By IMF Staff. (March 26th, 2001) Also see Yianni, Andrew. “Resolution of Sovereign Financial Crises — Evolution of the Private Sector Restructuring Process.” Financial Stability Review. London: Bank of England. (June, 1999)
[104] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.”
[105] Frankel, Jeffrey and Nouriel Roubini. “The Role of Industrial Country Policies in Emerging Market Crises.” (October, 2000) Pg. 50.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Lipworth & Nystedt. Also, “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises,” by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments of the IMF.
[108] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.” Pg. 31.
[109] Clover, Charles. “IMF and Ukraine Start Talks on Debt Restructuring.” Financial Times. (January 18th, 2000)
[110] Ibid.
[111] Lipworth & Nystedt. Pg. 30.
[112] Ostrovsky, Arkady. “Ukraine Using Net for Debt Exchange.” Financial Times. (February 8th, 2000)
[113] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.” Pg. 31.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Benady, Alex. “Ukraine Puts Off the Debt Collectors.” PR Week. (May 26th, 2000)
[116] Ibid.
[117] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.” Pg. 32.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Roubini, Nouriel. “Bail-In, Burden-Sharing, Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in Crisis Resolution and Constructive Engagement of the Private Sector. A Primer: Evolving Definitions, Doctrine Practice and Case Law.” Stern School of Business, New York University, NBER, and CEPR. (July, 2000) Pg. 55.
[120] Folsom, George A. “Implications of its Default on its Brady Bond.”
[121] Edwards, Sebastian. “Latin America at the End of the Century: More of the Same?” Also see Cline, William. “The Role of the Private Sector in Resolving Financial Crises in Emerging Markets.” Institute of International Finance. (October, 2000)
[122] Gopinath, Deepak.
[123] Gopinath, Deepak.
[124] Ibid.
[125] “A New Deal for Debt.” Latin Finance (September, 2000)
[126] Gopinath, Deepak.
[127] Emerging Market Country Products and Trading Activities. Comptroller’s Handbook. Comptroller of Currency at the OCC of the U.S. Treasury Department. (December, 1995)
[128] Gopinath, Deepak.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Gopinath.
[131] “A New Deal for Debt.”
[132] Gopinath, Deepak.
[133] MacMillan, Rory.
[134] Gopinath, Deepak.
[135] Newport, Samantha. “Did the IMF Drop the Ball in Ecuador?” Business Week. (January 31st, 2000)
[136] “The Ecuadorian Recovery Program.” A Statement by the IMF Representative at the Meeting with Private Creditors in New York. (May 16th, 2000) Pg. 1.
[137] “Ecuador: Back from the Brink.”
[138] Lipworth, Gabrielle and Jens Nystedt. Pg.33.
[139] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises — Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds.” Pg. 33. Also see Lipworth and Nystedt. Pg. 33.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Gopinath, Deepak (2). “Putting Ecuador’s House in Order.” Institutional Investor. (September 1, 2000)
[142] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.” Pg. 34. Also see Lipworth and Nystedt. Pg. 34.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Lipworth and Nystedt. Pg. 35. Also see Buchheit, Lee C. “How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap.” International Financial Law Review. Vol. 19, Issue 12. (December, 2000)
[145] “Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises.”
[146] Gopinath, Deepak. (2)
[147] Lipworth and Nystedt. Pg. 35.
[148] Lindenbaum & Duran. Pgs. 3-4.
[149] Ibid. Pg. 4.
[150] Buchheit, Lee C. “How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap.”
[151] Lipworth & Nystedt. Pg. 35. Also see Buchheit, Lee. “How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap.”
[152] Ibid.
[153] Buchheit, Lee C. “How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Trap.”
[154] Ibid.
[155] Global Development Finance 2001. The World Bank Group. Pg. 173.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Roubini, Nouriel. “Bail-In, Burden-Sharing, Private Sector Involvement (PSI) in Crisis Resolution and Constructive Engagement of the Private Sector. A Primer: Evolving Definitions, Doctrine Practice and Case Law.” Stern School of Business, New York University, NBER, and CEPR. (July, 2000) Pg. 59.
[159] Buchheit, Lee & G. Mitu Gulati. “Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges.” UCLA Law Review. (October, 2000)
[160] Ibid.